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8 The monarchy and public values 1910-1953* 
Philip Williamson 
As a former imperial proconsul and cabinet veteran of the Abyssinian 
and Rhineland crises, the Marquess of Zetland was not easily alarmed; 
yet in November 1936 he described the government as `faced with a 
problem compared with which even the international issues, grave as 
they assuredly are, pale into comparative insignificance'. This and similar 
comments by other public figures during that year' might be dismissed 
as over-reactions, characteristic of the loss of proportion which afflicts 
many statements about the British monarchy. King Edward VIII's wish to 
marry Mrs Simpson hardly seems so menacing as the activities of Franco, 
Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin. There was no constitutional conflict and no 
civil disorder, only an exercise in political management; fears of national 
and imperial calamity were swiftly dispelled by a straightforward dynastic 
adjustment, substituting one brother for another on the throne. 
Yet a retrospective view that the severity of the `abdication crisis' was 
exaggerated begs the question of why contemporaries regarded the King's 
proposed marriage as such a fundamental problem. It also raises larger 
questions about the monarchy's position in early twentieth-century pub- 
lic life. A leading theme of statements about the monarchy was that 
although its political power had declined, its public significance had 
increased. Baldwin, for example, declared in 1935 that `the influence 
of the Crown, ... the necessity of the 
Crown, has become a thing of 
paramount importance'. ' The monarchy also appeared to have become 
I am most grateful to Peter Ghosh, Ged Martin, Andrzej Olechnowicz, Jonathan Parry 
and David Craig for constructive criticisms of an earlier draft; to the British Academ} 
for a research readership; and to Pamela Clark at the Royal Archives for valuable advice. 
After the first citation, titles of royal biographies are abbreviated as KG 1', etc. 
Zetland to Linlithgow, 27 Nov. 1936, Zetland papers, Mss Eur D 609'7'136, Oriental 
and India Office Collections, British library; and see e. g. The Reith Diaries, ed. C. Stuart 
(London, 1975), p. 188 (28 May, 10 July 1936); T Jones, A Diary With Lamers 1931-1950 
(London, 1954), p. 290 (3 Dec. 1936); The Diarv of Virginia libolf, ed. A. O. Bell, vol. 5 
(London, 1984), p. 39 (7 Dec. 1936). 
2 In strict terms this traditional designation is misleading. The problem was the King's 
proposed marriage; his abdication was not the cause of the crisis, but its solution. 
3 The Times, 4 May 1935. 
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more popular, as shown spectacularly in 1935-7 by the Silver Jubilee, 
George V's death, and George VI's coronation, and again in 1952-3 
by George VI's death and Elizabeth II's coronation. So remarkable was 
the public interest on each occasion that for the first time since Bagehot, 
commentators and academics began to regard the monarchy's popular- 
ity as an intellectual problem. 4 By 1953 there seemed to have been an 
`extraordinary upsurge and renaissance of monarchical feeling ... 
in the 
last thirty or forty years'. 5 
During those years the conditions for monarchy had been transformed, 
and not obviously in ways which assisted it: still greater concentration of 
power in the hands of politicians and officials; the establishment of a fully 
democratic electorate and emergence of a powerful labour movement; 
prolonged periods of economic difficulties, social distress and indus- 
trial unrest; millions conscripted and hundreds of thousands killed and 
wounded in `the King's service', and the civilian population exposed to the 
bombings, privations and dislocations of total war; republican secession 
from the United Kingdom, and an Empire becoming a Commonwealth 
of autonomous nations. Across Europe other monarchies collapsed, and 
were often succeeded by fascist or communist dictatorships. Although 
Britain did not suffer the military defeats or revolutions which destroyed 
continental monarchies, these new conditions were challenging for its 
own monarchy and some could be regarded as dangerous. During the 
first decade of George V's reign, he and his advisers were fearful of 
the monarchy's chances of survival, particularly because they suspected 
the Labour party of republican aims. Anxiety about public feeling 
had very personal repercussions: during the First World War the King 
replaced his family's German name and titles with English neologisms, 
renounced his German relatives, and refused refuge for his Russian 
cousins. ' Edward VIII's marriage proposal and abdication were certainly 
crises for the royal family itself, and George VI thought he had been 
3 E. g. E. Jones, The psychology of constitutional monarchy', New Statesman, 1 Feb. 1936; 
K. Martin articles in Political Quarterly and New Statesman 1936- 7, summarized in his 
The Magic of Monarchy (London, V)37); H. Laski, Parliamentary Government in England 
(London, 1938), pp. 388-96. The 1936- 7 royal occasions also prompted the creation 
of the social research organisation, Mass-Observation: see P. Ziegler, Crown and People 
(London, 1978), pp. 9-10, and H. Jennings and C. Madge (eds. ), May The Twelfth 
(London, 1937; 1987). 
S S. Haffner, `The renascense of monarchy', Twentieth Century 154 (1953), 418. See also 
E. Shils and M. Young, `The meaning of the coronation', Sociological Review 1 (1953), 
63--81, and for a historical verdict R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures. England 1918- 1951 
(Oxford, 1998), pp. 3,7. ' 
F. Prochaska, `George V and republicanism 1917-1919', Twentieth Century British History 
10 (1999), 27-51, and F. Prochaska, The Republic of Britain (London, 2000), pp. 154--78. 
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encumbered with a tarnished and unsteady throne. Yet the monarchy 
emerged unscathed, and by the time of Elizabeth II's accession none at 
the Palace could have been disturbed by republican nightmares. 
How did the monarchy remain secure and popular? Why, in the new 
political democracy from 1918 and social democracy from the mid 1940s, 
was it presented as more, not less, important? Why did it preserve its 
considerable prominence rather than subsiding, as some in the 1930s 
suggested it should, 7 into the more discreet role of the Scandinavian 
monarchies? Answers to these questions also provide the best context 
for understanding Edward VIII's abdication. Despite excellent and well 
documented accounts of the episode, 8 speculation continues about sup- 
pressed political or policy causes - that his marriage proposal was a min- 
isterial or `establishment' pretext for removing a King with inconvenient 
sympathies towards the unemployed or Nazi Germany, and still more 
inconvenient populist political ambitions. Such claims persist largely 
because since 1936 the contemporary public considerations have lost 
most of their force and so seem, wrongly, to provide insufficient explana- 
tion for the King's departure. " Understanding the reasons for the monar- 
chy's continued significance shows why as late as the 1930s a royal mar- 
riage could still be a major problem of state. 
I 
With an institution so long established and so central to public life as 
the monarchy, in any relatively short period little is wholly new: the main 
patterns are continuity, adaptation and renovation. The constitutional 
position and political role; the alluring combination of ceremonial dis- 
play, domesticity and `ordinariness'; the Christian example and philan- 
thropic endeavours, and the provincial and imperial visits of the royal 
family 
- all have antecedents in the reign of Victoria or even George 
III. Even projection in the new mass media of radio, film and televi- 
sion added only greater immediacy to the already enormous coverage 
of the monarchy in the existing mass media of print and photographic 
New 
, 
Statesman, 12 Dec. 1936, and see below, p. 241. 
The 'abdication' files released by the Nauonal Archives in 2003 add little to the essentials 
cumulatively established from other sources by K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Bald zi 
(London, 1969), ch. 34; F. Donaldson, Eduard 1711 (London, 1974). chs. 14-23; M. 
Bloch. The Reign and Ahdicanon of Eduard VIII (London, 1990); and also, with earls 
access to the government files as well as Edward VIII's papers, by P. Ziegler, King Eduara 
VIII (London, 1990), chs. 14 18. 
°A 
recent example, notwithstanding valuable documentary research, is Susan Williams, 
The People's King (London. 2003). 
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reproduction. ' ° Nevertheless, reflection on the monarchy's adjustment 
to early twentieth-century conditions reveals much about its character 
and, more significantly, about the support it received from other institu- 
tions and voluntary organizations. The instances of renewed royal effort 
are mostly familiar: more public ceremonies, more frequent royal vis- 
its, increased patronage of voluntary social and medical services, and 
the innovation of a silver jubilee, where the precedents were only for 
golden and diamond jubilees. " There was, however, a further develop- 
ment deserving closer examination: the monarchy became more vocal. '' 
As the royal family's activities and visits increased, so its members made 
more speeches and issued more messages, heard or received more public 
addresses, and attracted greater media commentary. Collectively these 
statements provided sustained expositions of what the monarchy repre- 
sented and commended, and explanations of the social meanings of its 
ceremonies, visits and philanthropy. The effect was to enhance what had 
become its chief function - to express and symbolize public values. 
The pressure upon members of the royal family to speak could be 
inexorable, overcoming their own reluctance. This was especially so for 
what became the monarchy's most important speaking occasion. It was 
nine years before George V could be persuaded to broadcast a Christmas 
Day message, but in 1932 it made such an impact that he found he could 
not escape its annual recurrence. ' 3 So necessary a royal attribute did 
public speaking become that serious difficulties arose with George VI. 
Before 1914 a royal stammer would have been a minor matter, but in the 
1920s it raised doubts about the then Duke of York's suitability for public 
duties. Even with assistance from a speech therapist and a BBC sound 
engineer, the preparation, rehearsal and delivery of his speeches were an 
ordeal for himself, his staff, and event organizers. His first Christmas 
broadcast, in 1937, was explicitly intended to end the new `tradition'; 
li) See, notably, L. Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1701' 1837 (New Haven, 1992), ch. 
5; F. Prochaska, Royal Bounty (New Haven, 1995); W. H. Kuhn, Democratic Royalism 
(Basingstoke, 1996); J. Plunkett, Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch (Oxford, 2003); 
and Jonathan Parry's chapter in the current volume. These qualify the chronology and 
main thesis of D. Cannadine, 'The context, performance and meaning of ritual: the 
British monarchy and the "invention of tradition" c. 1820- 1977', in E. Hohsbawm and 
T. Ranger (eds. ), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 101--64. 
In early discussions it was called a `semi-jubilee': Bishops meeting, 24-25 Oct. 1934, 
Lambeth Palace Library. Little evidence appears to have survived on the jubilee's origins. 
It would not have occurred without ministerial approval, but it does not follow that the 
motives were party-political: see below note 48. 
Though again this was not entirely new: see The Principal Speeches and Addresses of His 
Royal Highness the Prince Consort (L)ndon, 1862). 
T. Fleming (intro. ), Voices out of the Air. The Royal Christmas Broadcasts 1932- 1981 (Lon- 
don, 1981), pp. 5- 9; Reith Diaries, pp. 181- 3; K. Rose, King George V (London, 1983), 
no. 3()3--4. 
II 
12 
13 
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Figure 8.1. King Geoge VI delivering the 1944 Christmas Day broad- 
cast ( The Royal Collection). 
only with great difficult- was he persuaded after the outbreak of war to 
revive it. 14 
Monarchs and their family members rarely spoke extempore or wrote 
their own speeches and statements. Royal pronouncements received 
immense publicity and required elegance and tact, but royal individuals 
themselves lacked the literary ability, application and confidence to pro- 
duce suitable prose. '' A few speeches (not just the parliamentary king's 
Speeches) were written by government ministers, who certainly vetted 
any significant statements bearing on constitutional or policy issues. More 
were drafted by civil servants, and for overseas tours an official was either 
iI J. Wheeler-Bennett, King Gcor'c 17 London. 1 Q58'ý, pp. 1335,207 S. 212 5.10 1.428, 
440: S. Bradford. George 17 :, London. 1 Q8Q 1. pp. 159- o l. 272 3.276-A), 41 Q, R Rhodes 
James. Sprit (', rdau, rred. 77ic Polirreal Role of Gcorec 17 (London. I Q08). pp. 176- S. and 
for 1()3-,, lot,: -e5 our if the Air. pp. 21,2b. In a later controversy about the monarchy's 
standing, Elizabeth II'% speeches were a leading point of criticism: see Lord Altrincham. 
The monarchy today', Narional and Enghch Reviet: 140 1 105-7 1. pp. b3.65. 
On the shortcoming. of their unaided written and spoken statements. see e. g. Rose. 
KGI', pp 15,5h, 182 3. Lcrrer, fro, ri a Prince 1918 1921. ed. R. Godfrey ; London. 
1 Q08), r. ix and oas : nz. 
j5 
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seconded to the royal staff for the purpose or supplied by the local gov- 
ernor or ambassador. ' 6 Recognized masters of public prose were also 
recruited. Kipling composed several speeches for George V and his sons, 
and the first two Christmas broadcasts. ''' Archbishop Lang wrote the 
next two. During the Silver Jubilee, Lang drafted both the King's broad- 
cast and the House of Lords' address to the King, John Buchan wrote 
the House of Commons' address, and G. M. Trevelyan the King's reply 
to these two addresses. 18 Authors of George VI's Christmas broadcasts 
included Baldwin, Churchill, R. A. Butler, and Arthur Bryant. 19 Material 
for speeches to corporations and societies was usually provided by one of 
the organization's officers, or another expert in the field. Most of the work 
was done by the private secretaries to each member of the royal family: 
they selected draftsmen, revised their texts, and wrote many speeches and 
statements themselves, just as they drafted most official letters from the 
King and his family members as well as explicitly writing letters on their 
behalf. Stamfordham, George V's secretary until 1931 and a `masterly 
draftsman', set the standard; 20 his successors Wigram and Hardinge pre- 
sumably contributed too, but the most prolific speech-writer was Sir Alan 
Lascelles, beginning with Edward as Prince of Wales and continuing with 
George VI and Princess Elizabeth. '' 
Royal public language was, therefore, the work of numerous minds, 
which itself indicates that the monarchy was associated with a well rec- 
ognized vocabulary and set of messages. Notwithstanding the contem- 
porary legend and historical shorthand which speak of monarchs alone 
deciding the institution's course, such collective effort was also true of 
ib 
1- 
IK 
19 
20 
21 
E. g. Ziegler, KEI7II, pp. 139,157; Wheeler-Bennett, KGI'I, p. 216; James, Spirit 
Undaunted, pp. 69,161,249,282; Bradford, KGVI, p. 500. Identifying the original 
authors of the speeches is not easy, as they observed a protocol of confidentiality and the 
Royal Archives preserve the convention that the words of royal persons are their own. 
Not, as usually stated, just the first one: see tripling papers 21 7 -9,17, University 
of Sussex Library, and for drafts of other speeches, D. Gilmour, The Long Recessional 
(2002), p. 308. 
A. Don diary, 6,9 May 1935, Lambeth Palace Library; D. Cannadine, G. M. Trezvtvan 
(London, 1992), pp. 122-4 (Trevelyan also wrote the Jubilee leader in The limes); 
MacDonald to Wigram, 21 Feb. 1935, PREM 1-173, National Archives: this file contains 
further documents showing that the prime minister's office staff co-ordinated and refined 
all these addresses. 
Hardinge to Baldwin, 29 Nov., 16 Dec. 1939, Baldwin papers 178313-4, Cambridge 
University Library; M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. iv 1939-1941 (London, 1983). 
p. 961; A. Howard, R. A. Butler (London, 1987), p. 131; Lascelles to Bryant, 21 Dec. 
1946, Bryant papers D4, King's College, London; Cf. Bradford, GI7, p. 605. 
Oddly, on this point the earliest official biography is the most frank: J. Gore, King George 
I' (London, 1941), pp. 147-8,209,220. 
Donaldson, EVlll, pp. 102,398; Ziegler, KEVIII, pp. 178,183,250; In Ronal Service. 
Letters and Journals of Sir Alan Lascelles 1920-1936, ed. D. Hart-Davis (London, 1989), 
pp. x, 10,117; James, Spirit Undaunted, pp. 176,249. 
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its general position in public life. It was not just that for state business, 
ceremonies and other public duties, they were advised and organized by 
their private secretaries and senior court officials. Nor was it only that this 
royal bureaucracy was assisted by a network of government and unoffi- 
cial advisers - civil servants, ministers, elder statesmen, churchmen, the 
editor of The Times, officers of voluntary societies and charities. " The 
modern monarchy's public character had never been determined only 
by those close to the Palace. 23 In a society becoming less hierarchical 
and more plural, it could not have preserved its position and popularity 
without much broader institutional support. Members of the public did 
not just admire or accept the monarchy for itself and because of its own 
efforts; they did so also, and crucially, because it was approved by most 
of the public bodies and voluntary organizations to which they belonged 
or which they supported or respected, and by most of the media which 
further influenced their opinions. 
Why did this wide organizational support remain available? One answer 
is that the monarchy had become uncontroversial. Since the 1830s it had 
been publicly distanced from electoral and party politics. From 1910 
limitation of the House of Lords' powers and George V's relative disen- 
gagement (in contrast to his father) from London `society' made it seem 
less tied to the aristocracy and plutocracy. The Great War ended its links 
with the autocratic continental monarchies, and renewed its position as 
the focus for patriotic sentiment. 
Yet if ostensible non-partisanship was a necessary condition of its pub- 
lic status, it is not a sufficient explanation. The monarchy was for many 
not just a matter of indifference, or simply tolerated: it was positively, 
enthusiastically, admired. Nor was it -- nor could it be - entirely neu- 
tral, however much it was removed from public controversies: the royal 
family's instincts were conservative, 24 the sovereign remained supreme 
governor of the Church of England, and monarchy was the epitome of 
social inequality and privilege. It was able to be uncontroversial only 
because organizations which might have been critical or cool chose to 
treat it as such, overlooking its remaining partisan features. 
See Nicolson, K(; I', p. 452, for George V saying that Stamfordham 'taught me ho« 
to be a King', and for other examples Prochaska, Repuhhc ,? l Britain, pp. 157-60,162- 
3,165 76,178-9. For the general point see also D. Cannadine, From biography tc 
history: writing the modern British monarchy', Historical Research 77 (2004), 300- 1. 
See e. g. Colley, Britons, pp. 217-29, and Plunkett, Qucc1, Victoria. ch. I 
24 Remarkably, James. Spirit Undaunted. pp. 286,278, describes George VI as a 'progressive 
liberal', even a 'radical'. presumably because of his earlier association with voluntary 
social welfare. But that was entirely compatible with Conservatism, and hardly justifies 
aligning him with Attlee's socialism: see also Prochaska, Rival Bounty. pp. 22Q- 47: 
R. McKibhin. Classes and Cultures. EnelanJ 1918" " 1951 (Oxford. NO). P. 6. 
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Why was this so? The bodies which approved of the monarchy were 
not, or not wholly, passive recipients of its messages and symbolism. 
As Prochaska has argued for voluntary service societies seeking royal 
patronage, it is misleading to regard such bodies as simply deferential 
or dazzled. They identified with royalty because they expected benefits 
for themselves. Most directly, these could be status, publicity, increased 
donations, or honours for their leaders; but more generally, the bene- 
fits were assistance in preserving or promoting conditions and attitudes 
which upheld or advanced their own purposes. These organizations con- 
tributed to the monarchy's public character by projecting on to it what 
they themselves admired; and the Palace was usually responsive, indeed it 
commonly arranged for royal individuals to say what particular organiza- 
tions wanted, provided it was expressed as uncontroversially as possible. 
Besides hospitals and welfare charities, these bodies included numerous 
religious, educational, youth and sporting associations, and the patri- 
otic and ex-servicemen's organizations that emerged from the Great War, 
notably the British Legion. Commercial groups used royal patronage or 
images to help sell their products, and the Prince of Wales became the 
first member of the royal family to promote British goods in overseas 
markets, visiting and speaking at South American trade fairs in 1927 and 
1931. The various media gave huge coverage to royalty not just in order 
to boost their circulations or audiences, but also to underpin their own 
political and social stances or, for the BBC, public service aims - con- 
cerns which, as the newspapers' self-censorship over Edward VIII's affair 
demonstrated, induced a sense of public responsibility which overrode 
their journalistic instincts and commercial interests. Most important, to 
the traditional support from the armed forces, civil and diplomatic ser- 
vices, political government, and Conservative and Liberal parties was 
now added, contrary to royal suspicions, that of the Labour movement. 
Plainly these different organizations did not always approve of the 
monarchy for the same reasons, but the cumulative effect was to cre- 
ate considerable public expectations about the reputation and behaviour 
of the royal family. Most of its members understood that royalty had 
become much less about power and privilege, and much more about 
public example and service. It was now a vocation, or more prosaically a 
job in what George VI privately called `the family firm'. 25 The strength 
of these expectations was shown in November and December 1936. 
The public language of monarchy had some notable characteristics. 
Ceremonial addresses and official documents retained their studied 
archaisms but after 19 1 8, in accordance with the new demotic conditions, 
Bradford. (i 17. n. 5. 
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most royal speeches and organizational addresses became rather less ele- 
vated. 26 Even so, royal language remained inflated and generalized, and 
might be considered so artificial, stylized and obsequious as to be vacu- 
ous. Certainly its literal accuracy was slight: it had only loose and selective 
connections with political and social realities and with the private char- 
acters of royal persons. George V, George VI, and even Edward VIII 
were hardly impressive or accomplished in their own right, yet like their 
predecessors they were publicly invested with exceptional qualities of 
knowledge, insight, sympathy, piety and power. Incongruously, again in 
response to the new democracy, there was also renewed emphasis on the 
Victorian trope of members of the royal family as also being `ordinary' 
people. Yet even in their ordinariness they were, it seemed, extraordinary: 
the perfect family with blissful home lives, outstanding in their hobbies 
of shooting, stamp-collecting, yachting, riding or gardening. 
However, to expect literal meaning from royal language is to misunder- 
stand its purpose, which was not descriptive but exemplary - to express 
and endorse public values. The more the monarchy had become elevated 
above sectional controversies, the more convincing and useful it became 
in symbolizing and universalizing values which most public and volun- 
tary bodies considered essential for the general interest. Consequently, 
preserving respect or reverence for the monarchy and maintaining ide- 
alized images of members of the royal family seemed matters of great 
public importance, an attitude shared by very nearly all the media: in this 
period, public criticism of royalty became something close to taboo. '' 
In commissioning George V's official biography, Lascelles told Harold 
Nicolson that the King had been the subject of a myth' and that his book 
would 'have to be mythological' . 
2K But such attitudes were not, could not 
be, just manufactured by the Palace or sustained by the government; their 
sources were wider and more spontaneous. As Tom Jones, the adviser of 
many public figures, observed just before Edward VIII's abdication, 'w"e 
invest our rulers with qualities which they do not possess and we connive 
at the illusion - those of us who know better - because monarchy is an 
illusion that works'. 2 
u '`' As is evident from comparison of the pre-1914 and pest-1 Q 18 speeches in T'hc King 
_ 
His ßople 1911 35 (London, 1935). 
Sec Martin, Magic off 1VfonarchrI, pp. Q- 10. Altrincham's mild comments in 1Q57 (like 
those of Muggeridge in the New Sraresnian a little earlier) attracted remarkable degrees 
of outrage: P. Brendon and P. Whitehead. 7-he R' indsor. (1994; 2000), pp. 152 4. 
'' Harold Nrcolson. Diaries and L treys 1930 1964. ed. S. Olsen (London. 1980), p. 334. 
Lascelles added, however, that this meant omission of any discreditable matters, not 
writing untruths or exaggerations; and despite occasional hyperbole, Nicolson's biogra- 
phy remains one of the most intelligent books about the modern monarchy. 
Tones. Diary with Liters. n. 291 (8 Dec. 193äl. 
232 The Monarchy and the British Nation, 1780 to the Present 
This is not to argue that the monarchy reflected some `natural' moral 
consensus in British society, nor that it could genuinely symbolize the 
whole nation or empire. The values projected upon and expressed by the 
monarchy were `ideological' responses by various groups to particular 
early twentieth-century conditions. 30 Economic and social strains, war 
mobilization, civilian exposure to bombing, and totalitarian and atheistic 
threats meant that despite many continuing and new internal disagree- 
ments, there was a shared and pressing concern for basic political, social 
and moral stabilization - obviously so from conservative perspectives, but 
also within the Labour and other progressive movements which dreaded 
communism nearly as much as fascism, and which wanted to preserve 
arrangements and attitudes conducive to reform. Consequently a long- 
established and conventional monarchical language and symbolism were 
now renewed or acquired new references. A private comment in 1935 by 
Beatrice Webb gives one view of the outcome: 
The universal popularity of the royal family is the biggest asset of the status quo 
within Great Britain and its Empire. What a political paradox! Powerless puppets 
saving the face of the British constitution. The King and Queen, the royal dukes 
and their Duchesses, above all the Prince of Wales, are good souls and do their 
duty with exemplary piety. How long will they save the situation for western 
civilization - i. e. capitalist dictatorship plus political democracy, plus a veneer of 
the Christian faith? " 
Webb was an admirer of Soviet Russia, but if her more pejorative terms 
had been toned down only a little and if the status quo were taken to 
mean the institutional and moral framework rather than the distribu- 
tion of wealth, most public figures of all political persuasions would have 
accepted the truth of her statement, including the verdict that civilization 
was at stake. The paradox of a powerless monarchy having great public 
importance is resolved by understanding its function in expressing and 
symbolizing public values. Five aspects had particular significance: con- 
stitutionalism, social cohesion, the empire, Christian witness, and public 
morality. 
II 
Royal and constitutional historians commonly claim that early 
twentieth-century monarchs retained significant direct political influence, 
f. 
30 
31 
So in terms of a celebrated debate, the following argument is closer to N. Birnbaum, 
`Monarchs and sociologists', Sociological Review 3 (1955), 5-23, than to Shils and Young, 
`The meaning of the coronation'. 
Beatrice Webb diary, 9 Feb. 1935 (microfiche edn. ). 
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underpinned by the continued importance of their residual constitu- 
tional prerogatives. Yet for contemporaries the key feature of their public 
position was, as Webb wrote, their lack of power. Historians of govern- 
ment and political leadership, who rarely find it necessary to bring the 
sovereigns into their explanations, have agreed, with much more justifica- 
tion than commentators on the Victorian period. 32 George V and George 
VI were certainly active, because for them and their secretaries what 
Bagehot had described as the monarch's rights - consultation, encour- 
agement and warning - were positive duties. They and their secretaries 
diligently read government papers and collected further advice and infor- 
mation, and sent a stream of enquiry, exhortation, suggestion and some- 
times protest to ministers and officials on innumerable large and small 
subjects. Constitutional niceties and civil service procedures ensured that 
they were normally kept informed, and that their comments and questions 
received respectful and considered responses. Nevertheless the quantity 
of this activity far exceeded its importance and effect. For ministers, par- 
liamentary, party and electoral considerations and their own assessments 
had long been decisive, and Palace views had influence only where these 
coincided with these pressures or calculations. Even prime ministerial 
attentiveness towards the monarch had ceased to be an official or political 
necessity, and become a matter of personal inclination. Exchanges with 
the Palace were now routinely handled by private secretaries rather than 
by ministers themselves. 33 Lloyd George hardly bothered communicat- 
ing with the Palace at all, and Baldwin never corresponded with the King 
on business and spoke with him only about every six weeks. Only during 
the Second World War did Chamberlain and Churchill establish what 
came to be regarded as a `tradition' of weekly meetings with the monarch 
during parliamentary sessions, and then only as a pleasant courtesy and 
to help keep him informed. 3' George V could be awkward and persistent, 
i? 
See Michael Bentley's chapter in the current volume. From publication between 19070 
and 1932 of selections from the Queen's correspondence, contemporaries knew that 
political practice had only recently caught up with constitutional theory (and with 
Bagehot): see F. Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen I ictoria (Oxford, 1935); Martin, 
Magic of 'Monarchy, pp. 46- 53; Laski, Parliamentary Government, pp. 3Q7-401. 
As is evident from prime ministerial files; and for the particular case of the 'King's letters', 
the traditional daily report from the Commons leader or home secretary on House of 
Commons proceedings, see Baldwin Papers. A Conservative Statesman 1908-4, ed. P. 
Williamson and E. Baldwin (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 3,503. 
Brendon and Whitehead, The W'indsors, pp. 44-- 5; Baldwin in Mackenzie King diary. 7 
Oct. 1928, online at http: -king. collectionscanada. ca; James, Spirit Undaunted, p. 206. 
More frequent meetings (usually luncheons) are not in themselves evidence of political 
significance; and the claims that George VI had 'considerable' influence with Churchill 
and became 'a major element in government' (ibid., pp. 207-8,221,230,284) are 
simply incredible: cf. the verdicts in D. Cannadine, 'Churchill and the British monarchy', 
Transactions of the Rival Historical Societe ts. 11 (2001). 264.271. 
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but he well knew that he had to act according to ministerial advice, and 
he did not obstruct and wear down ministers as Queen Victoria had 
done. By 1918 the dangers of public criticism for the monarchy's repu- 
tation, privileges and even - as he would have thought - survival seemed 
all too great; fear of socialism was a powerful constitutional check. The 
instinct for safety also emasculated the prerogative powers. When during 
the 1910-14 constitutional deadlocks Liberal and Unionist leaders each 
pressed him to exercise these powers in their own interest, the King was 
haunted by the fear that if he took the advice of either he would embitter 
half the nation; and it was only in the desperate hope of escaping this 
choice and forcing the politicians to compromise that, paradoxically, he 
resorted to (empty) threats of ignoring ministerial advice and exercising 
his ostensible powers. Thereafter, while the Palace guarded the principle 
and spirit of the prerogative as a guarantee for the monarchy's status, in 
practice its aim was to avoid the exercise of its powers, or failing that, to 
minimize the effect. When a possible decision loomed, advice on constitu- 
tional principle was sought; but the real purpose of this consultation was 
political calculation - to ascertain what would cause least controversy and 
the least harm to the monarchy, and what the leading poiiticians them- 
selves wanted or would accept responsibility for. 35 This is evident in the 
monarchy's major political acts during this period. In 1923 Baldwin as 
a member of the House of Commons was manifestly the safer choice as 
prime minister than Lord Curzon, given that the Labour opposition then 
lacked any representative in, and was still committed to abolishing, the 
House of Lords. In August-October 1931, the King certainly helped to 
establish and perpetuate a `National' coalition government, but he did so 
on the well informed and accurate understanding that, given the unusu- 
ally awkward political circumstances, this was already being considered 
by the Labour prime minister and leaders of the other parties . 
3' By the 
1940s, George VI and his secretaries welcomed party arrangements and 
civil service procedures which relieved them of the embarrassment of 
political choices. 3' 
As was routinely observed at the time, the end of the monarchy's direct 
political power had been vital for the elevation of its indirect political 
significance: it became a purer symbol of constitutional government. 
3' Nicolson, KG I", p. 115, sensibly emphasizes the distinction between the historical sur- 
vival of powers and the political expediency of their exercise. 
30 P. Williamson, 
. 
'r'ational Crisis and. 1'ational Government 1926- 1932 (Cambridge, 1992), 
pp. 152-- 3,232,274, chs. 9,12, and see the Bogdanor-Williamson exchange in Twentieth 
Century British History 2 (1)91), 1-25,328--43, ignored in V. Bogdanor, The Monarchy 
and the Constitution (Oxford, 1995), pp. 104- 12. 
3 ', E. g. James, Spirit Undaunted, pp. 305--b, 31 Q -22. 
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For two centuries the essence of the monarchy's strength had been its 
personification of a parliamentary constitution in which the `Crown-in- 
Parliament' was the sovereign body. This constitution and its associated 
`Whig' history of unfolding freedoms had long been at the core of British 
national identity, and this gave the monarchy broad and deep ideological 
foundations. 3s But two new elements preserved its prestige: its publicly 
smooth transition into a symbol of parliamentary democracy, and a succes- 
sion of pressures which made constitutional government seem still more 
precious. During the First World War the King's speeches identified him 
with the `cause of freedom, liberty and justice' against tyranny and mil- 
itarism. 3Q After 1918 the monarchy symbolized a constitutional system 
of government which had not only secured military victory, but which in 
comparison with other European regimes seemed to guarantee stability 
and liberalism against the threats of both revolution and reaction. During 
the Labour party advances of the 1920s and 1940s a public absence of 
royal opposition seemed to confirm that this system was impartial not just 
between parties, but also between classes and socio-economic doctrines. 
More fundamentally still, just as in earlier centuries the British consti- 
tutional monarchy had represented resistance to foreign despotisms, so 
during the 1930s and 1940s it became a leading symbol in the defence 
of democracy against the continental dictatorships. 
In these senses, the monarchy remained or became valuable for each of 
the main political parties. Reduced public discussion about its political 
role and about the monarch's opinions is indicative. This was due as much 
to the restraint of the politicians as to that of the monarchs: in contrast to 
1910-14, after 1918 the monarchy was too important to be dragged into 
party politics. 40 For Conservatives, calls for royal obstruction to a Labour 
government were not worth the risks of provoking a Labour backlash 
which might weaken the monarchy's place in the implicit ideological and 
institutional checks against socialism. Conversely, Labour leaders feared 
that criticism of the monarchy might stiffen conservative resistance and 
reduce the opportunities for advancing socialism. Labour attitudes were 
obviously crucial. The party had never been republican, but before 1914 
it contained some outspoken republicans and a larger number of other 
socialists who disliked the monarchy as the apex of the system of inherited 
See J. Parry, chapter 2 above. also, from a quite different perspective. T. Nairn. 7h' 
Enchanted Glass. Britain and its Monarch % kL. ondon, 1 Q88). 
The King to His People, pp. 66 7,71 2.75,88,04 b. 110,11 , 8. 
The main, but only momentary, exceptions Were Asquith in late 102 3 and Iioyd George 
in early 1929, because royal intervention after indecisive general elections had become 
one of the last hopes for the Liberal party's return to government: M. Cowling, Thk 
Impact of Labour 192(} 1924 (Cambridge, 107 1), p. 351, Lloyd George speech discussed 
in Stamfordham to Vansirtart. 2Q April 192Q. Royal Archives PS GV K. 2223 11. 
236 The Monarchy and the British Nation, 1780 to the Present 
privilege. In 1910 its parliamentary leaders pointedly treated the King's 
civil list as if it represented the income of `a President of a Republic'. In 
1936 and 1937 their successors again wanted reduction of the monarchy's 
costs. 4' But only a handful of (mainly Scottish) left-wing MPs called for 
its abolition, and the reallocation of its palaces, wealth and income to the 
poor. 42 Most Labour politicians took it for granted that the monarchy was 
popular among the working population, and regarded changes to its status 
as a lower priority than economic and social reform. The more republi- 
can members assumed that it would wither away as socialism advanced, 
and for the meantime considered a hereditary non-partisan monarch less 
inconvenient than an elected, politicized, president. 43 But the chief rea- 
son for the Labour party's acceptance of the monarchy, and for some of 
its members being monarchists, was its absorption of a long tradition of 
popular constitutionalism and its understanding that monarchs no longer 
governed and were not an obstacle to further political and social progress. 
Faith in and commitment to established political procedures outweighed 
objections to the monarchy as the embodiment of social inequalities. 44 
It was assumed that just as monarchs in the past had acted on Liberal 
and Conservative ministerial advice, so they would accept the advice 
of Labour ministers; only if any obstruction were attempted might the 
monarchy's position be reassessed. 45 As is well-attested, the Palace's atti- 
tude towards the first Labour government was vital. In 1923-4, George 
V and Stamfordham did not want socialists as the King's ministers, and 
only after unco-operative Conservative and Liberal decisions made this 
inescapable did they decide that it would be wise to treat Labour leaders 
with an elaborate display of accommodation, trust and friendliness. The 
tactic was highly successful. For working-class ministers and their fami- 
lies it sealed their sense of arrival and achievement, and for the Labour 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
House of Commons Debates, 5th. series (HCDeb) 19, c. 1627-40 (Barnes, 22 July 1910); 
311, cc. 1590- 5,1615-21,1634 (Pethick-Lawrence and Cripps, 5 May 1936); 324, cc. 
40- 5,72- 7,455-60 (Attlee and Pethick-Lawrence, 24 May, and Greenwood, 27 May 
1937). 
E. g. HCDeb, 311, cc. 1603-15,1637--52 (5 May 1936); 318, cc. 2191-6,2206- 12, 
2218--Q (10-11 Dec. 1936); 324, cc. 49-56 (24 May 1937). 
E. g. S. and B. Webb, A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (Lon- 
don, 1920), pp. 108-10; Lansbury in Labour Parry Annual Conference Report 1923, p. 251, 
and see Prochaska, Republic of Britain, pp. 188- 9. 
R. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950 (Oxford. 
1990), pp. 17-27; N. Kirk, `The conditions of royal rule: Australian and British socialist 
and labour attitudes to the monarchy 1901-11', Social History 30 (2005), 64-88; and 
see N. Owen, 'MacDonald's parties: the Labour party and the "aristocratic embrace" 
1922-31', Twentieth Century British History 18 (2007), 1-53, at 9-16. 
This was the purport of the only significant interwar public admonitions to monar- 
chs from leading Labour politicians, in 1924 and 1934: R. Postgate, George Lanshur-v 
(London, 1951), pp. 224-5, and C. Cook, Stafford Capps (London, 1957), pp. 159 -60. 
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party it seemed the ultimate endorsement of its own legitimacy, fitness to 
govern and right to seek reform. 46 It now seemed fully in the party's inter- 
est to subscribe to the principle - more accurately, a convenient fiction - 
that monarchs were entirely neutral in their personal political opinions, 
and to observe the convention that ministers should not divulge their 
sometimes strongly expressed views. Labour leaders made little of some 
socialist intellectuals' charges that the 1931 National government was 
`born of a Palace Revolution'. Nor did they (any more than did the Üb- 
eral and Conservative anti-appeasers) criticize George VI's very public 
support for Chamberlain after the Munich agreement. 47 
The apotheosis of the monarchy as the symbol of democratic consti- 
tutionalism came in the mid 1930s. An official theme for George V's 
Jubilee in May 1935 was celebration of the `constitutional progress' dur- 
ing his reign, 48 but implicitly and often explicitly a further message was 
comparison with the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. The King's 
address to Parliament declared that `the perfect harmony of our Parlia- 
mentary system with our Constitutional Monarchy' had been found to 
be the `best way to secure government by the people, freedom for the 
individual, the ordered strength of the state and the rule of law over gov- 
ernors and governed alike'. " Ministers and opposition leaders presented 
constitutional monarchy as a barrier to dictatorship, 50 and the remark- 
able popular enthusiasm for Jubilee events was attributed partly to `the 
people realizing the contrast between the homely ways of the King andthe 
bullying of the continental despots'. 1 On George V's death it was not 5 
46 It should, however, be recorded that while the often-quoted account of the King's recep- 
tion of his new Cabinet in J. R. Clynes, Memoirs (London, 1937), i. 343-4, no doubt 
accurately reflected Clynes's sentiments, these `memoirs' were actually written by Frank 
Stuart, a professional ghost-writer: Stuart to Gilmour, 26 Aug. 1937, Gilmour papers 
GD383'69-16, National Archives of Scotland. 
The King was plainly imprudent in early October 1938, and was nearly even more so: 
James, Spirit Undaunted, p. 144. But the claim that his actions were `unconstitutional' 
originated much later, with John Grigg in 1989: A. Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (Lon- 
don, 1994), p. 21. 
MacDonald to Wigram, 21 Feb. 1935, PREM 11 73. There is no evidence for a common 
assumption that the National government planned the jubilee specifically in order to 
boost its re-election prospects (e. g. Rose, KGI, p. 394). Ministerial files show that care 
was taken to avoid party-political implications and to involve all major parties in jubilee 
events. Moreover, at the time of the jubilee a general election was not due for another 
seventeen months; only in October did Baldwin decide on an earlier election, in the 
unexpected conditions created by the Abyssinian war. But as Jonathan Parry suggests 
(above p. 70), the decision was probably connected more generally with the government's 
claim to be a 'National', non-party, arrangement. 
His Majesty's Speeches. The Record of the Silver Jubilee (London, 1935), pp. 50-1, and see 
the Lords and Commons addresses, pp. 42,43. 
Baldwin in Times, 4 May 1935; other party leaders in HCDeh 301, cc. Q77-87 (8 May 
1935), 308, c. 17 (23 Jan. 1936); and Martin, Magic of Monarchy, p. 15. 
Jones, Diary With Letters, p. 148 (20 May 1935). 
47 
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Conservative or Liberal politicians but the Labour leader, Attlee, who 
praised him as a 'democrat'. 52 At the 1937 coronation, which received 
the same blanket coverage in the Labour movement's newspaper, the 
Daily Herald, as in the conservative popular press, Labour spokesmen 
described the institution itself as democratic: `the monarchy exists by the 
will of the British people'. 53 During the Second World War the anti-fascist 
crusade, an all-party coalition government, and Churchill's constitution- 
alist rhetoric cemented this identification of monarchy with democracy 
and freedom. Major Crown honours, first accepted by trade-union lead- 
ers in 1935, now began to cascade through the party. 54 There was simply 
no reason to withhold support from an institution that proclaimed many 
political values admired by the Labour party, and which represented a 
parliamentary system which from 1945 ensured consent to socialist leg- 
islation. As the Daily Herald had declared in 1937, the monarchy sym- 
bolized the `underlying unity of a community in agreement, not about 
everything, but about the political method by which everything will be 
decided'. '' 
It was in these terms that the `abdication crisis' seemed alarming, yet 
passed so easily. The issue was not any attempt by Edward VIII to revive 
royal power, nor political differences with his ministers. His views on 
peace, Anglo-German friendship and social issues were virtually identi- 
cal with those of his father, and indeed his successor - and, more to the 
point, with those of most Cabinet members. He was less discreet than his 
father, but his notorious phrases that `something should [must, will] be 
done' about South Wales unemployment were uncalculated and became 
significant only when they were exploited by anti-government newspa- 
pers, for which he expressed regret. 56 If ministers heard of his occasional 
52 
54 
55 
56 
HCDeb 308, c. 16 (23 Jan. 1936). 51 Ibid., 324, c. 457 (27 May 1937). 
Some trade union leaders had accepted the lesser OBE awards instituted in 1917, but 
Citrine's and Pugh's 1935 knighthoods had been controversial. The 1924 and 1929- 
31 Labour governments had recommended the creation of several peers, but for the 
practical purpose of conducting House of Lords business; only after 1940 were peerages 
accepted as `honours': see P. Williamson, `The Labour party and the House of Lords 
1918- 31', Parliamentary History 10 (1991), 317-4 1. 
Daily Herald, 13 May 1937. It is commonly stated that during the debate on the Abdi- 
cation Bill in December 1936, some 100 MPs would have voted for a republic if the 
Labour party had allowed a free Commons vote; but this is one of those persistent mis- 
understandings which beset accounts of the modern monarchy. The story can be traced 
back through Wheeler-Bennett, KGI'1, p. 299, to C. Petrie, Monarchy in the Twentieth 
Century (1952), p. I11. But Petrie had misread his source, which not only has the lower 
figure of 40 to 50 MPs but offered these numbers as a `fancy', a speculation - and this 
from a hostile, right-wing, Conservative MP: see C. Petrie, The Modern British Monar- 
chy (1961), pp. 24,177, this time correctly citing A. Wilson, Thoughts and Talks (1938), 
p. 246. No other source indicates division among or pressure on Labour MPs over the 
relevant vote, on an ILP republican amendment supported by just seven MPs. 
Cabinet minutes, 27 Nov. 1936, in Baldwin Papers, p. 396. The King used different 
versions of the phrase (should, must, will) in statements at different stopping places 
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offhand boasts about imposing his will in government, they knew from 
his lack of application to state business how empty such statements were: 
compared to George V, he was in these terms very much a lightweight. 
Pressed by Mn Simpson, he did make suggestions for keeping himself 
on the throne, but he himself never seriously resisted Baldwin's opinion 
that marriage required his abdication. Nor did he countenance a polit- 
ical campaign on his own behalf. Rather, the real danger lay elsewhere: 
that anti-government mavericks like Churchill and the Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere newspapers, or the anti-parliamentary fascists and commu- 
nists, might make the King's wishes an issue for political division, in effect 
if not intention reviving royal independence in public affairs and, at a time 
of international difficulties, distracting government and the nation with 
constitutional disputes. It was towards forestalling this type of political 
division that Baldwin directed his efforts, particularly by ensuring it was 
made plain that the King himself chose abdication rather than renunci- 
ation of Mrs Simpson. Like almost every other public body, the Labour 
party took the strictest constitutional view: that irrespective of opinions 
about the King's proposed marriage and despite its own hostility towards 
the National government, it was vital to uphold the principles of min- 
isterial authority and parliamentary supremacy. The Daily Herald even 
argued that any other course `might easily lead to fascism', and stigma- 
tized public demonstrations in the King's favour as `anti-democratic'. '' 
The most significant political feature of the episode is that there was, 
after all, no real crisis; the speed and completeness of Baldwin's success 
testifies to the enormous importance attached to constitutionalism, the 
more so in an ideologically tense period. 
III 
Total war and chronic economic difficulties gave renewed momentum to 
the traditional conception of the monarchy as a focus and force for social 
cohesion. With the mass mobilization of the First World War, through 
appeals for volunteers, exhortations to conscripts and civilian workers, 
5- 
dunng his tour (Daily Herald and Daily Mail, I Q. 20 Nov. IQ 36). but except for a critical 
comment in MacDonald diary, 21 Nov. 1Q36, these passed unremarked by ministers 
until the Daily Mail used them several days later for its own purposes: Baldwin in Jones. 
Diary with Letters, p. 288 (25 Nov. IQ 36). The King had already said he would abdicate, 
and privately he blamed the Welsh unemployment problems not on the government 
but on local 'socialists' and 'bolshevism': R. Rhodes James, Victor Cazalct (London, 
1976), p. 186 (diary, 19 Nov. 1936). For the King's distinctly callow political views. 
see Donaldson, F_1711, pp. 191 206,253- b, and Ziegler. KFI71I, pp. 182-6,204- 11, 
26b-75. 
Daily Herald, 5,7,10 Dec. 1930: it attributed the demonstrations to incitement by the 
British Union of Fascists and the Communist party. 
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investitures, hospital and factory visits, and messages to bereaved fami- 
lies, the royal family touched the lives of more people than ever before. 
From evoking patriotism and endurance for a united war effort and then 
leading national acts of remembrance for the war dead, there were easy 
transitions to appealing for united efforts in post-war reconstruction and 
later in mitigating the effects of unemployment. In the face of indus- 
trial unrest and social distress, governments and voluntary organizations 
were as eager to exploit the monarchy's ability to inspire loyalty and co- 
operation as the Palace was to demonstrate its social relevance. Precisely 
because class conflict and social alienation were feared, royal rhetoric 
presented `the people' as united and wanting still closer `brotherhood' 
or `fellowship'. 58 Speeches and commentaries, as well as royal visits and 
patronage, systematically created an impression of closeness between the 
monarchy and the working population. Royal persons were said to share 
the `hopes and joys, and fears and sorrows' of all classes of `the people', 59 
and were, it seemed, prodigious in their `deep' or `constant' interest in 
medical, child-care, educational, housing, sanitation, industrial, scien- 
tific and artistic schemes. For the royal family it was important that their 
eldest son, like the sons of other families, could be said to have `shared 
with My Armies the dangers and hardships of the campaign'. 60 Famously, 
the Prince of Wales was later projected as a champion of ex-servicemen 
and the unemployed, particularly as patron of the British Legion and 
the National Council of Social Service. b' But by the 1930s, building 
upon a long tradition, encouragement and appeals for those in distress - 
the sentiments that `something must be done' - were expected not just 
from any one royal individual but from the whole royal family, support- 
ing both voluntary organizations and the National government's private- 
public partnership schemes. George V's Jubilee broadcast declared that 
`I grieve to think of the numbers of my people who are still without work. 
We owe to them ... all the sympathy and 
help that we can give. I hope 
that ... all who can will 
do their utmost to find them work and bring 
them hope'. The purpose of his son's Jubilee Trust, to assist youth welfare 
organizations, was chosen to commemorate the `devotion to the welfare 
of the people which His Majesty has personified supremely throughout 
58 
5v 
E. g. The King to His People, pp. 95,156-8,280- 3,308- 9. 
E. g. Lord Halifax in Times, 4 May 1935; MacDonald in HCDeb, 301, cc. 979--80 (8 
May 1935). 
The King to His People, p. 53. There was no indication that, to Prince Edward's own 
dismay, he was kept away from military action. Curiously, Prince Albert's service in the 
navy (which included battle experience) and later in the air force went unmentioned in 
the King's collected public statements, presumably to preserve the focus on his heir. 
Though see Prochaska, Rüval Bounty, pp. 190,196,201 -4,210, for a gap between public 
image and personal commitment. 
60 
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his reign'. 62 Edward VIII's replacement by George VI did not change this 
style of presentation, because the former Duke of York had as consider- 
able a record as his brother of `keen interest in social questions'. 63 And 
the new King and his Queen soon acquired a public cult of their own. The 
Second World War had an even greater effect than the first in identifying 
the monarchy with a genuinely national purpose, and the Queen proved 
at least Edward's equal in conveying spontaneous human interest. The 
story that after the bombing of Buckingham Palace in September 1940, 
she said that she now felt she could `look the East End in the face' is 
apocryphal b4 nevertheless this does capture the royal family's determi- 
nation, amplified by official propaganda, to be seen to share the dangers 
and privations of the `people's war', and to set an example of fortitude 
and defiance. 
For a leading Conservative in 1935, the Crown was `symbolic of all the 
persons and things that together compose the life of our nation ... and 
speaks of the essential unity that is greater than all the accidental differ- 
ences that may exist between us'. 65 Again, statements by Labour politi- 
cians reveal the widespread absorption of such attitudes. Lansbury spoke 
of how the royal family's social sympathies had helped break down Labour 
suspicions that `the Monarchy would preserve for ever the domination of 
class'. After George V's death, Attlee described him not just as a `demo- 
crat' but still more surprisingly as a `real social reformer', who had `rec- 
ognized the claims of social justice'. b6 For the Labour leaders monarchy 
had, it seems, become compatible with their party's commitment to social 
equality. They did treat the abdication as an opportunity for a `new start', 
but they meant only that the monarchy should be made more accessible 
and still more popular. Occasional and `reasonable' pageantry was desir- 
able, but continual ritual and the `narrow and privileged' courtier class 
hampered the monarch's true work. In 1937 they proposed an enquiry 
into the royal family's `mode of life', on the principle that `utmost simplic- 
ity in the monarchy,... will ... 
bind together the people and the Monarch 
The King to his People, p. 299; National Council of Social Services memo., Jan. 19 35. 
PREM 1 "173, and more generally Prochaska, Ro'val Bountn-, chs. 6- 7. 
Crown and Empire. The Coronation of King George 17 (Times, 1Q37), pp. 8--Q. 
The source is not contemporary, but a sentimental biography by an author who became 
a court correspondent only after the war had ended: B. S. Shew, Queen Elizabeth, the 
Queen Mother (London, 1955), p. 76. The phrase was lent authority by Wheeler-Bennett. 
KGL7, p. 470. 
Halifax, Times, 4 May 1935. 
HCDeh 301, c. 981 (8 May 1935), 308, c. 17 (23 )an. 1Q 36), and see Laski, Parliamentarti 
Government, p. 392, for the cynical observation that the , Monarchy ... 
has been sold to 
the democracy as a symbol of itself. 
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Figure 8.2. The royal family as `ordinary' and domestic: 'Conversation 
piece at the Royal Lodge', 1950. by Sir James Gunn (National Portrait 
Gallery). 
more closely than before'. " Ten years later, they presumably thought that 
war and austerity had effected these changes. In the depths of post-war 
economic crisis, Labour ministers agreed that Princess Elizabeth and the 
Duke of Edinburgh should have a full ceremonial wedding and, against 
opposition from their own backbench MPs, a generous civil list. Accord- 
ing to Attlee, `our British monarchy today ... 
is in essence simple ... and 
Attlee, Pethick-Lawrence and Greenwood in H(. I)eb 318, cc. 2204- 5 (11 Dec. 19 36 ). 
and 324. cc. 40 5.72 7.455 t0 (24.27 May 1937). 
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approachable', and the couple needed the money to do what the general 
public wanted them to do, `visiting round the country ... 
[and] coming 
into contact with the people'. '8 
Symbolizing and cementing unity was a still more insistent theme in 
relation to the Empire and Commonwealth. The zenith of the imperial 
monarchy is usually placed in the late Victorian and Edwardian peri- 
ods, but the association of monarchy and Empire actually increased after 
1914. On the one hand, the two world wars showed the extent to which 
British international power and even national defence now depended on 
imperial resources, and during the interwar years and again after 1945 
both British and Dominion governments regarded an imperial trade and 
sterling bloc as the chief means of escape from economic depression. Yet 
on the other hand, the Dominions and India were obtaining greater self- 
government and had stronger nationalist movements. As a more challeng- 
ing world made the overseas empire more valuable, so a `non-political', 
supra-national and liberal monarchy was considered vital for preserving 
the sense of imperial unity. Within Britain itself, organizations, events 
and media aiming to stimulate popular imperial sentiment continued 
to proliferate, and to be leading vehicles for publicizing the monarchy's 
importance. b9 
The belief that the Empire depended on the monarchy was as central 
for George V's and his advisers' strategy of royal survival as the display 
of social benevolence. '' At the unionist government's urging, he himself 
had as Prince of Wales been sent around the Dominions in 1901 and to 
India in 1905-6 in order to make the Crown and empire visible to their 
populations, and in 1911 he insisted on attending the Indian Durbar. 
From 1919 to 1925 he sent his eldest son on even longer Dominion and 
Indian tours to capitalize on and consolidate wartime imperial patriotism. 
The King privately disliked the increasing concessions made towards self- 
government, yet because his various governments used the monarchy to 
endorse the Empire's re-constitution and publicize its revised ideology, 
the effect of these concessions was to enhance his own status. The 1926 
Balfour formula and 1931 Statute of Westminster `exalted' the monarch 
by making him king of each Dominion, leaving the sovereign as the sole 
constitutional link between Britain and the Dominions, and declared 
ex 
; f1 
Ibid. 445, cc. 1745-7 (17 Dec. 1947) ; B. Pimlott, The Q: ken. A Brograpinv of Elizabetf; 
11 (London, 1946), pp. 125- 32.146 -8. The 160 dissident Labour MPs were 
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the new Commonwealth to be united by its `common allegiance' to the 
Crown. Against the Congress party's demand for Indian independence, 
the King-Emperor was similarly elevated as the focus of allegiance for 
the various princes, provinces, races and religious groups within new 
all-India political structures. '' Baldwin expressed the conventional view 
during jubilee week: 
If in any cataclysm the Crown vanished, the Empire would vanish with it ... 
[No] 
political party ... would 
hold together an Empire scattered throughout the world 
and that great Indian Empire besides. More and more as the older [Imperial] ties 
became attenuated, the ties of the Crown become stronger and more personal 
ever' year. ' 
Royal speeches welcomed self-government while speaking of indissoluble 
imperial links, links which would become stronger because now based 
on co-operation and shared ideals: the Empire-Commonwealth was a 
`great instrument for justice, peace and goodwill'. 73 The 1935 Jubilee 
was staged as much to proclaim Dominion and Indian `devotion and 
affection' for the King as to celebrate national cohesion, 74 and when on 
his deathbed he supposedly asked `How is the Empire? ', this was treated 
as hugely significant: it was even, unlike most royal stories, `very nearly 
true'. ' 5 
In 1919 Stamfordham had told the Prince of Wales that `the throne 
is the pivot upon which the Empire will more than ever hinge. Its 
strength and stability will depend entirely on its occupant'. 76 When in late 
1936 King Edward, supposedly much impressed by his imperial tours, 
remained unmoved by appeals to the importance of Dominion opinion, 
this came as a shock. The marriage proposal and then the abdication 
had potentially harmful consequences for imperial relations, even aside 
from the Irish government immediately exploiting the episode to reduce 
its constitutional links with Britain still further. In public, the only possi- 
ble course was to pretend that nothing had happened. In his coronation 
broadcast George VI declared that he had `felt ... that the whole 
Empire 
was in very truth gathered within the walls of the Abbey'. Royal tours of 
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the Dominions resumed, beginning with Canada in 1939 and only post- 
poned by the war; the King became patron of the Empire Day movement, 
and he spoke of `a new vision' of an Empire of `free peoples' opposed to 
'the spirit of domination and the lust of conquest'. ' Even when the 
Empire began to vanish in the late 1940s, with India becoming a repub- 
lic and the King-Emperor turned into `Head of the Commonwealth', to 
all appearances this was not loss but evolution. In Churchill's broadcast 
on George VI's death, the crown was `the magic link ... which unites 
our loosely bound but strongly interwoven Commonwealth of nations'; 
indeed the character of the sovereign was `vital to the future ... of world 
freedom and peace'. In public presentation, at the 1953 coronation the 
monarchy was no less an expression of British leadership of a `fellowship' 
of nations than it had been at the 1935 Jubilee. 18 
The monarchy's function of symbolizing unity was made more effec- 
tive by two additional elements. The pressures on social cohesion, on the 
Empire and on the monarchy itself stimulated further development of the 
traditional metaphors of the king as father, the nation and Empire as fami- 
lies, and the royal family as emblematic of all ordinary families. Even more 
than during the previous century, royalty's own family occasions - wed- 
dings, births, anniversaries, funerals - were presented as public events, 
encouraging in ways that Bagehot would have recognized 'a curious pro- 
cess of identification of royal family life with the individual life of the 
subject' . 
7' But what especially evoked this sense of closeness was the use 
of radio. The earliest royal broadcasts were for the imperial service, and 
the BBC wanted a King's message on the family occasion of Christmas 
because it would reach exceptionally large and susceptible audiences. s° 
With monarchs able to speak to millions of people in their homes, the 
speech writers saturated the broadcasts with personal pronouns and fam- 
ilv references: `I would like to think that you ... and all the peoples of 
this Realm and Empire are bound to me and to one another by the spirit 
of one great family's' Commenting on George V's last Christmas mes- 
sage in his own imperial broadcast on the King's death, Baldwin made 
the extraordinary assertions that 'it is as members of a family that we are 
Icing George 17 to His Peoples (London. 1452), pp. 2.7-Q, 22-4-MacKenzie. Propaganda 
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mourning him' and that `there must be millions who feel as I do that 
a wise and loving friend and counsellor has been taken from us'. More 
remarkably still, this had some truth: as Labour commentators observed, 
among the general public large numbers appeared to feel something akin 
to personal loss. g 
IV 
Secularization has made it difficult to appreciate the continued signifi- 
cance of religion in public life during the early twentieth century. Until 
the 1960s, Britain remained a Christian nation. Total church member- 
ship reached its historic peak in the 1900s and declined only slowly, with 
recoveries in the late 1920s and the 1950s; and although a large majority 
of the population were not regular church-goers, most retained Christian 
beliefs, respected Christian moral rules and observed the churches' rites 
of passage. s3 The monarchy's Christian witness and identification with 
the established English and Scottish churches remained important for 
the nation's explicitly Christian life, and royal rituals were at the core of 
a more diffuse `civil religion' ; 14 while for all the churches, the pressures 
of growing secularization and challenges from fascist paganism and com- 
munist atheism made the monarchy's example seem still more valuable. 
The royal family was upheld as a model of Christian fidelity, charity, 
probity, and domestic virtue. Prayers for the sovereign and singing of 
the national anthem - `God Save the King' - were still part of common 
experience. Much royal philanthropic endeavour was emblematic of reli- 
gious values, and the connection was made still clearer by the revival in 
1932, for the first time since 1698, of the sovereign personally distributing 
alms at the annual Royal Maundy service. 85 Many royal ceremonies were 
also national religious events, and the coronations, deaths and funerals of 
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Figure 8.3. The Christian monarchy: `The Coronation ceremony of His 
Most Gracious Majesty King George V in Westminster Abbey. 22 June 
1Q1 1', by J. H. F. Bacon (National Portrait Gallery). 
sovereigns evoked both church appeals for reaffirmed Christian commit- 
ment and, it seemed, considerable evidence of continuing popular Chris- 
tian belief. ``' During the First World War there was a revival of national 
days of prayer -- united appeals for divine intercession during extraordi- 
nary national anxieties, or thanksgiving for divine assistance after reliefs 
or victories - which had fallen into abeyance since the 1850s. The king 
. called his people to prayer'; the royal family usually attended a state ser- 
vice at St Paul's Cathedral or Westminster Abbey, accompanied by the 
nation's other leaders; and churches throughout the nation and empire 
were crowded for special acts of worship. During the Second World 
War, national days of prayer became frequent -- usually twice a year 
and the last one, a call for national re-dedication in the face of economic 
difficulties, was approved by the Labour government in 1947.8All this 
carried greater force from the traditional British Protestant doctrine that 
the nation and its monarchy enjoyed exceptional divine favour. Corona- 
tions were presented as national re-consecrations, renewing the sacred 
M. Grimlev, Cttizeriship, (; omntunttr and the Church of Eng>iaºnJ . 
Oxford. 2004',, pp. 184 
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qualities of the nation's institutions and `the organic union of the people 
and their sovereign under divine providence'. 8ß As the Dean of Durham 
wrote in 1937, it was `no mere accident that the one royal house which 
has been for a century consistently true to its Master's teaching is the one 
which has survived a century of unrest with ever growing honour'. 89 The 
kings themselves customarily spoke in quasi-priestly terms, bestowing 
God's blessings, invoking God's help, offering thanks to God. 90 George 
VI was especially fervent, overcoming his hatred of broadcasting twice 
for national days of prayer, and again to call for special prayers on D- 
Day: `we dare to believe that God has used our Nation and Empire as an 
instrument for fulfilling His high purpose'. 91 
Notwithstanding the sovereign being supreme governor of the Church 
of England, the other religious denominations had long shared the admi- 
ration for the monarchy, and successive modern sovereigns, notably 
Queen Victoria, had given indications of reciprocating this regard. 92 This 
convergence continued, reinforcing the monarchy's representative char- 
acter and making it more ecumenical. George V and George VI were 
devout yet undoctrinaire in their faith, ready to encourage closer rela- 
tions between the various churches and, as they saw it, to solidify their 
allegiance; and in a spiritually more threatening world, the denomina- 
tions themselves sought closer association with a Christian king as rein- 
forcement for their own efforts and as confirmation of their integration 
into national life. In 1910 George V successfully backed a movement to 
modify the statutory `Protestant declaration' in his parliamentary acces- 
sion oath, removing the imprecations against Catholic doctrines likely to 
offend the Roman Catholic populations of the Empire. 93 Although orig- 
inally national days of prayer had strictly concerned only the established 
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churches, the Free Churches and the Roman Catholic Churches, and 
indeed the Jewish community, came to observe them in their own ways. 
In 1917, during the Palace's reassessment of the monarchy's role, Arch- 
bishop Davidson persuaded the King himself to take over the public ini- 
tiative in calling days of prayer on the grounds that this would `evoke 
enthusiastic support' from `religious people of all denominations', peo- 
ple on whom the King `might have to rely in hours of national strain and 
confusion', Q4 and thereafter, on the King's behalf, the archbishops made 
them truly national by routinely consulting the other religious leaders 
in advance. When after the 1918 armistice George V became the first 
sovereign to worship at a Free Church service, their leaders regarded 
this as a historic lifting of `the social stigma' on their denominations. 
They successfully lobbied for participation in the 1935 royal jubilee ser- 
vice (the Free Church Federal Council president read a lesson), and 
received places in the ceremonial processions at the 1937 and 1953 coro- 
nations - though they remained disappointed that these were still Angli- 
can rather than fully `national' occasions. 95 Matters were easier with the 
Scottish churches. In 1929-30 the Duke of York became the first mem- 
ber of the royal family to be appointed Lord High Commissioner to the 
Church of Scotland in order to mark its reunion with the Free Church 
of Scotland, and in 1953 the Moderator of its General Assembly, as rep- 
resentative of the nation's second established church, became the first 
non-Anglican to participate in a post-Reformation English coronation 
service. 
A considerable weight of religious expectation lay upon the sovereign. 
Archbishop Lang was probably right in saving that the British people felt 
that George V's `life was founded, as they instinctively desire the life of 
themselves and of their country to be founded - on the faith and fear of 
God'. 9b In some sense the monarch's religion was regarded as standing 
for that of the whole nation, or as Baldwin expressed it in social terms to 
George VI: 
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the average working man likes to spend Sunday morning in bed reading the 
newspaper, if possible to the accompaniment of a pint of beer. But he says to 
himself all the time, `Well, anyhow, I am glad that the King and Queen are going 
to Church even if I am not doing it myself this morning'. " 
A king who `knows little ... and cares 
little, about the Church' was always 
liken, to stumble into difficulties. It was Edward VIII's failure to attend 
church regularly that prompted the famous rebuke of Bishop Blunt, which 
gave the newspapers their pretext for revealing his relationship with Mrs 
Simpson. 98 
Christian witness was not the only way in which the monarchy 
remained, in Bagehot's term, `the head of our morality'. A royal house- 
hold official, the Lord Chamberlain, was still responsible for theatre 
censorship, and George V had more direct influence here than in most 
other public matters. He also commented freely to government ministers 
on issues of public morality. His expressions of `disgust' at newspaper 
reports of `gross' intimate details in divorce cases made some contribution 
towards 1926 legislation which prohibited publication of `indecent mat- 
ter' from judicial proceedings. " Disapproval of matrimonial irregularity 
itself was still more evident. `Guilty parties' in divorces were excluded 
from Palace functions until at least the late 1950s, except that - perhaps 
after a divorce was included in the first Labour Cabinet - divorced govern- 
ment ministers were invited in their official rather than personal capaci- 
ties. Even `innocent parties' were only admitted from the late 1920s, and 
only after they had submitted their divorce decree and even the case pro- 
ceedings for inspection by the Lord Chamberlain's office, as proof that 
their own behaviour really had been irreproachable. Mrs Simpson cer- 
tainly knew about this royal convention: before her presentation at court 
in 1931, she had to submit the records of her first divorce. 100 
By the standards of the time, most politicians were not especially cen- 
sorious about sexual and marital conduct. 1 Many had long known of 
Edward's attachment to Mrs Simpson and, as Baldwin indicated to an 
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unshocked Archbishop Lang, ministers would have been content if she 
had remained an unpublicized mistress. He even intimated this, more 
cautiously, to the King himself. Edward's objection that this would be 
hypocritical 102 showed an entire misunderstanding of prevailing public 
codes. For a sovereign to want a divorcee as his wife, let alone as queen, 
was scandalous - not simply in the modern sense of media prurience, but 
in the older meaning of deep moral disturbance. That Mrs Simpson was 
obtaining a second divorce that might well face legal challenge, publicly 
exposing the King to charges of adultery, only made matters worse. 103 Ali 
the churches taught that marriage was an indissoluble union, and such 
royal flouting of Christian principle seemed certain to weaken the respect 
and loyalty of Free Churchmen and Roman Catholics, in the Dominions 
as much as Britain. For the Church of England the difficulty was still 
greater: since the 1900s its strictures against re-marriage of divorced per- 
sons had been made more explicit, 104 and in these circumstances it could 
hardly allow even its own supreme governor a religious marriage. Nor 
would its archbishops feel able to admit the King to the sacrament of 
coronation - given its themes of Christian virtue, adherence to church 
principles and sacrifice for the sake of duty - with all the damage that 
might imply for church-state relations, the nation's spiritual life and, as 
many would suppose, the British Empire's place in the divine order. 1 °5 
The recitation of Edward's titles in the abdication legislation silently but 
eloquently omitted the statutory epithet, `Defender of the Faith'. 1116 
Even so, although the government was sensitive to Archbishop Lang's 
anxieties and the anticipated wider religious criticism, it did not act on 
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church advice but on broader and more secular concerns. Preservation 
of family life remained one of the highest social goods, considered by 
every organization involved in social and political issues to be essential 
for moral health, social cohesion and social improvement. For the largest 
women's organizations and much of the Labour movement, maintaining 
the security of marriage was also the foundation for raising the status of 
women. Conversely, many assumed that, as Princess Elizabeth's speech- 
writers would declare in 1949, divorce and separation were `responsible 
for some of the darkest evils of our society today')°' Divorce remained 
circumscribed by social disapproval and legal restriction, permitted only 
as an extreme and exceptional resort: even the advocates of the divorce law 
reform bill which was passing through Parliament during the discussions 
over Edward's proposed marriage justified it as a means to strengthen the 
institutions of marriage and the family. Such priorities explain why private 
sexual irregularity could indeed seem a lesser evil than public divorce, or a 
divorcee becoming queen. Not only was the royal family assumed to be a 
model family; a leading function of the monarchy was to set an example 
in upholding the sanctity of marriage - as in other matters, precisely 
because this now seemed under pressure. `Since the War', Baldwin told 
King Edward, `there has been a lowering of. .. public morals, 
but people 
expect even more of the Monarchy'. Later he would epitomize the point 
in a supposed saying of a `Yorkshire yokel': `You can marry a whore &I 
can marry a whore, but the King can't. Because the King is not a man 
but a job'. "" 
V 
The most ubiquitous public values were those clustered around the con- 
cept of `service': duty, self-sacrifice, mutual assistance. Obviously this 
was the ethic of government itself and the public services, but it was still 
more fundamental not just for the churches but also for the charities and 
voluntary services which before the creation of the welfare state helped 
sustain medical and social care. For many organizations the spirit of `ser- 
vice' provided much of the answer to actual or feared social and political 
problems, whether poverty, industrial conflict or revolutionary or reac- 
tionary movements. It was for Liberals integral to good citizenship, for 
Labour the essence of socialism, and for Conservatives an antidote to 
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socialism. Clearly its particular meanings and purpose varied, but every- 
one in public life extolled the general principle - and so were irresistibly 
drawn into extolling what had long been its most prominent and willing 
exponent, the monarchy. After the 1918 armistice George V's `message 
to the people' declared that the `sacrifices made, the sufferings endured, 
the memory of the heroes who have died that Britain may live, ought 
surely to ennoble our thoughts and attune our hearts to a higher sense of 
individual and national duty'. 10' The point was reinforced by the royal 
family's leadership of annual acts of remembrance and at the funeral of 
the Unknown Warrior, and their recurring tributes at his Tomb. `Public 
spirit', `unselfish service', an Empire `united by bonds of willing service', 
were characteristic royal phrases; and honouring the sacrifices of troops 
and appealing for service to assist the unemployed were the basis of the 
Prince of Wales's reputation for sympathy towards the working popu- 
lation. Even more than with other public values, there was an implied 
compact: to be respected, to retain its privileges, perhaps even to survive, 
the royal family had to practise, or appear to practise, what it preached. 
The new democracy, and the belief that only special moral qualities could 
hold it together, gave new force to the old notion of the king as servant of 
his people; and because of his exemplary role, the sovereign was presented 
even by Labour leaders as bearing a huge, almost unbearable, burden of 
work and responsibility. 110 George V's Jubilee was a liturgy to mutual 
service, and on his death Baldwin as prime minister declared that `the 
doing of his duty ... was the guiding principle of 
his life'. The King had 
`rigorously trained [his will] to place the public interest first and last', his 
`own ease and pleasure were never considered', and through his example 
'men had led better lives in the accomplishment of their daily duties ... 
at home and to their country'. ' " 
Given the force of royal image-making and the interests of the state, 
the churches, the bodies under royal patronage, and many other volun- 
tary organisations, this was the example that his eldest son was expected 
to follow. As the poignantly entitled Sermons for the Coronation of His 
Nfajesnv King Edward 1711 stated, `our king is our King by virtue of the 
service he renders', and `true royalty reveals itself in Self-denying sac- 
rifice'. Edward's speech-writers ensured that he appeared to subscribe 
wholly to this image: just as his father `was ever actuated by His profound 
sense of duty', so he was `resolved to follow in the way he was set before 
110 The King to His Pvopk, pp. Q5--6. 
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and see Record of the Silver Jubilee, passim, for many similar statements from other public 
fi¢ures. 
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me'. ' 12 It was not just his choice of a divorcee for his wife that offended 
conventional opinion; more disturbing still was his determination to place 
personal desire before public interest, a selfishness that struck at the heart 
of the most obvious and essential royal and public principles. Baldwin was 
astounded that he showed no moral or spiritual struggle, `no idea of sac- 
rifice for duty'. ' 13 Once the affair became public, numerous newspapers 
drew the social parallels: `sacrifice of personal feelings is one which men 
and women in all ranks of life are often called upon to make ... 
in obe- 
dience to the call of duty'. 114 The contrast between the King's behaviour 
and that of the millions who had served in the King's armed forces was 
all too plain. As Queen Mary tried again to explain to her still uncom- 
prehending son eighteen months later: `It seemed inconceivable to those 
who had made such sacrifices during the war that you, as their King, 
refused a lesser sacrifice'. ' 15 
The rest of the royal family also knew what was at stake: in a rever- 
sal of the monarchy's presumed relations with ministers, they turned to 
the prime minister in entreaty, apology, even shame, and then gratitude. 
George VI well understood that his main task was `to make amends' to the 
nation and empire. " The verbal rehabilitation of the monarchy testifies 
to what had become central to its public position. The King's coronation 
broadcast reiterated over and over the key message: `The highest of dis- 
tinctions is the service of others, and to the Ministry of Kingship I have 
in your hearing dedicated myself, with the Queen at my side, in words 
of deepest solemnity. We will, God helping us, faithfully discharge our 
trust'. Baldwin's coronation broadcast drummed home the wider moral: 
like the King and Queen, `let us dedicate ourselves ... to the service of 
our fellows, a service in widening circles, service to the home, service to 
our neighbourhood, to our county, our province, to our country, to the 
Empire, and to the world'. "' That George VI came to the throne unex- 
pectedly, reluctantly and, disadvantaged by his stammer, not obviously 
1 12 
113 
1 ia 
1 15 
I 16 
11 -1 
Alington et. al., Sermons, pp. 37,40, and passim; the King's message in HCDeh 308, 
c. 10 (23 Jan. 1936). 
Baldwin Papers, pp. 421--2. For a courtier's observations on the King's fatal selfishness. 
see Hart-Davis, King's Counsellor, pp. 108-9,415: `fundamental ideas of duty, dignity 
and self-sacrifice had no meaning for him'. 
Pews of the World, 6 Dec. 1936; Morning Post, 7 Dec. 1936; Birmingham Post, New3 
Chronicle and Scotsman, 11 Dec. 1936; and see Donaldson, ELIII, p. 299, describing a 
cartoon of a workman throwing down his tools with the comment `How can I do mý 
work without the woman I love beside me? '. 
J. Pope-Hennessy, Queen Mary 1867--1953 (London, 1959), p. 575. Letters from the 
general public in Baldwin papers, volumes 143 50, contain numerous references to the 
war dead and other personal sacrifices. 
Baldwin Papers, p. 416, and letters from other royal persons, ibid., pp. 413n, 415n, and 
in Baldwin papers volumes 176- 7. 
King George 11 to his Peoples, pp. 2- 3; Baldwin, Service, p. 144. 
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suited to the position, had the effect of emphasizing this renewed com- 
mitment to duty and service, and in time won him sympathy and respect. 
The message and example were made still more relevant - and more use- 
ful for the purposes of the government and most other public bodies - 
by the mobilization for the Second World War, the effort required for 
post-war reconstruction and the introduction of sweeping welfare and 
economic reforms. According to the King's 1941 Christmas broadcast, 
it was `in serving each other and in sacrificing for our common good 
that we are finding our true life'. 1 1" The ethic became very strong in the 
next royal generation. In a broadcast to mark her twenty-first birthday, 
Princess Elizabeth proclaimed `a solemn act of dedication' which would 
resonate through her 1953 coronation and in the buoyant notions of a 
`new Elizabethan age': 
I declare before you all that my whole life ... shall 
be dedicated to your service 
and the service of our great Imperial family ... 
But I shall not have the strength 
to carry out this resolution alone unless you join in with me, as I now invite you to 
do. God help me to make good my vow and God bless all of you who are willing 
to share in it. "0 
VI 
The monarchy retained its considerable prominence in the more demo- 
cratic conditions of the early twentieth century because it became more 
purely the symbol and exponent of a particular set of public values, val- 
ues promoted by almost all public organizations and respected by most 
of the general public. The abdication occurred because Edward VIII was, 
ultimately, indifferent or dismissive towards those values. No supposedly 
hidden political motives are required to help explain his departure: the 
public reason, his proposed marriage, was sufficient. The sensitivity of 
divorce for the monarchy was shown again in 1955 when, without any 
question of political complications, Princess Margaret was prevailed upon 
to renounce marriage to a divorced man, `mindful of the Church's teach- 
ing that Christian marriage is indissoluble, and conscious of my duty 
to the Commonwealth'. ''" Edward VIII's marriage proposal mattered 
so much because it bore upon wider aspects of public morality - and 
also because it raised a still more straightforward principle. For rhetor- 
ical purposes, political leaders commonly claim to speak for the whole 
tix Kmg George 17 to his Peoplo. p. 2(). 
ti Pimlott, The Quceri, pp. 1 15 -IR. The broadcast was written 
by Lascelles. who from 
the 1920s had been one of the Palace officials most critical of Edward's conduct. even 
resigning from royal service for a period: see Hart-Davis. Krnt''ý CounscUor. pp. 104 10. 
Pimlott, The Queen, pp. 201 2. _21 S 
20.2-32 Q; Hart hats. lýiný' (: nuºrsellor" pp. ! ()S- 
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`people' or nation, and Baldwin did so in his discussions with the King 
and in his House of Commons speech after the abdication. But what he 
and the Cabinet and officials really anticipated was public and newspaper 
division over the King's marriage proposal. 121 In royal image-making the 
individual and the institution could not easily be separated; many might 
feel attached to Edward the person, rather than to the monarch as per- 
sonified virtue. Yet the monarchy's greatest function was to symbolize 
national and imperial unity, and it was unacceptable that any individual 
monarch should be a cause of division on matters of public importance. 
In this sense the actual balance of public opinion was immaterial - though 
there is little doubt that Baldwin and the Cabinet did express the major- 
ity view and certainly that of most organizations, including the Labour 
movement. 122 
Understanding the monarchy's popularity is notoriously difficult. Dif- 
ferent individuals admired it for different reasons, and in various degrees 
of intensity. These reasons were not necessarily consistent. Some felt 
reverence towards a sanctified institution. Some were impressed by the 
pageantry, some by the illusion of proximity created by royal visits and 
radio broadcasts. Some admired royal philanthropy, and some idol- 
ized the romance of royal persons. Many respected the institution while 
responding to different aspects of what it represented. In November 1936 
industrial South Wales cheered the King for his sympathy towards the 
unemployed, but in December religious South Wales - largely the same 
people - was appalled by his proposed marriage. 
' 23 What can be said with 
some certainty is that various pressures and anxieties gave almost every 
other institution and association causes to approve and promote ideal- 
ized notions of the monarchy and the royal family, and that the kings, 
their advisers and their speech-writers developed styles of presentation 
and statement which preserved high levels of public respect. The public 
was deluged with reasons to admire the monarchy, and during the Silver 
Jubilee and the coronations and royal funerals, the radio, newsreels and 
print media made it almost physically impossible to escape these mes- 
sages. Even if these were not the only cause of royal popularity, they 
121 
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supplied a vocabulary for individuals to help express whatever other feel- 
ings of admiration or tolerance they felt towards it. These themes are aptly 
indicated by the comments of a road-sweeper and old soldier recorded 
by the novelist Philip Gibbs during the 1935 Jubilee: 
The Royal Family 
... 
is a very respectable lot ... 
Human, if you know what I 
mean. They feel kindly towards us, and we feel kindly towards them ... 
[The 
King's] all right! A nice fellow - not like that there Hitler in Germany who puts 
folks into concentration camps because they don't see eye to eve with him. [He] 
does his duty like the rest of us, like I do mine, and I don't envy him his job. 
That's why I'm loyal. That's why we're all loyal. '' 
124 P Gibbs. England 
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